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Abstract—We present scalable and parallel versions of Lip-
maa’s computationally-private information retrieval (CPIR)
scheme [20], which provides log-squared communication com-
plexity. In the proposed schemes, instead of binary decision
diagrams utilized in the original CPIR, we employ an octal tree
based approach, in which non-sink nodes have eight child nodes.
Using octal trees offers two advantages: i) a serial implementation
of the proposed scheme in software is faster than the original
scheme and ii) its bandwidth usage becomes less than the original
scheme when the number of items in the data set is moderately
high (e.g., 4,096 for 80-bit security level using Damga˚rd-Jurik
cryptosystem). In addition, we present a highly-optimized parallel
algorithm for shared-memory multi-core/processor architectures,
which minimizes the number of synchronization points between
the cores. We show that the parallel implementation is about
50 times faster than the serial implementation for a data set
with 4,096 items on an eight-core machine. Finally, we propose a
hybrid algorithm that scales the CPIR scheme to larger data sets
with small overhead in bandwidth complexity. We demonstrate
that the hybrid scheme based on octal trees can lead to more than
two orders of magnitude faster parallel implementations than
serial implementations based on binary trees. Comparison with
the original as well as the other schemes in the literature reveals
that our scheme is the best in terms of bandwidth requirement.
Index Terms—Number Theoretic Private Information Re-
trieval, Security, Privacy, Parallel Algorithms
I. INTRODUCTION
A private information retrieval (PIR) scheme is a protocol
that allows a user to access any data item, fx, in a remotely
stored database F (i.e., fx ∈ F), without revealing to the
database server the data item being accessed; primarily its
index x is not revealed to the server as data items are not
necessarily stored in encrypted form. PIR was first introduced
in [7] and has recently enjoyed considerably high attention as
a result of the raised awareness of privacy concerns pertinent
in outsourcing and cloud computing practices. In particular,
PIR can help a cloud computing user hide access patterns to
his data, which is demonstrated to reveal sensitive information.
In computational PIR (CPIR) [8], the difficulty of the server
(or any other third party) finding out the index x of the data
item during an access can be reduced to a computationally
difficult problem. Lipmaa’s computationally-private informa-
tion retrieval (CPIR) protocol [20] suggests using additively-
homomorphic encryption algorithm by Damga˚rd and Ju-
rick [9], whose security depends on the well-known decisional
composite residuosity assumption while other schemes in the
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literature depend on relatively less studied lattice problems as
in [1, 2]. There are also other recent schemes based on fully
homomorphic encryption techniques such as the one in [11].
Naturally, the user can always download the entire database
to obtain the requested data item (i.e., the trivial solution).
Therefore, the amount of data exchanged between the user
and the server during a PIR protocol run must be much
smaller than the database size. More formally, the exchanged
data amount must be sublinear to the size of the database.
While several techniques [1, 2, 11] successfully accelerate
the server-side computations, their bandwidth performance are
not always acceptable. The Lipmaa’s scheme (also known as
BddCpir due to its use of binary decision diagrams) is known
to offer superior bandwidth performance due to its log-squared
asymptotic communication complexity.
On the other hand, the BddCpir scheme is not one of the best
schemes in the literature in terms of computational complexity.
Therefore, the primary aim of this paper is to accelerate the
Lipmaa’s original scheme. The proposed schemes can also
improve its communication complexity for sufficiently large
databases.
a) Our Contribution: Firstly, we provide new, improved
versions of the original BddCpir [20] using octal trees, which
provide a significant improvement in the computational com-
plexity as well as a limited improvement in the bandwidth
performance. Secondly, we propose a non-trivial, efficient par-
allel algorithm for server-side computations. The new parallel
algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 2), relying on partitioning of the
database into subtrees, proves to be faster than Algorithm 1
in [29]. Thirdly, we give an in-depth theoretical analysis
of the proposed parallel algorithm to estimate the speedup
values that can be obtained for various database sizes when
different number of processor cores are used. In our analysis,
we show that the proposed parallel algorithm reduces the
number of synchronization points, which allows the proces-
sor cores to work independently. Since the computational
complexity increases with the number of data items, the
scheme becomes impractical for large databases. We present,
therefore, a slightly different method (i.e., the hybrid approach
in Section V) to scale the CPIR scheme to work with relatively
large database sizes. While the scheme in [29] provides imple-
mentation results only for a database with 512 items on a four-
core processor, we provide experimental results on computing
platforms featuring as many as 30 cores for databases with
up to 262,144 items. Finally, we give a comparison of the
bandwidth requirements of the proposed technique with those
in the literature, and show that the proposed technique is
the best due to its log-squared asymptotic communication
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complexity.
II. BACKGROUND
In the literature, there is a plethora of publications on private
information retrieval (PIR) protocols. One major category is
information theoretically secure PIR schemes (IT-PIR) [18].
A recent IT-PIR scheme by Goldberg [15] uses multi-server
approach with threshold cryptography, where privacy is in-
formation theoretically guaranteed as long as no more than
t (i.e., the threshold) servers collude. Other category of PIR
schemes includes computationally secure solutions, referred
as CPIR. A CPIR scheme bases its security on hard problems
such as integer factorization, decisional composite residuosity
problem, and lattice problems. The works in [1, 2, 4, 6–
8, 11, 20, 22–24] are some of the prominent examples of
CPIR in the literature. A recent work [10] proposes a hybrid
scheme that combines IT-PIR and CPIR. Most of the PIR
schemes suffer from high communicational complexity as
many PIR schemes have O(
√
(n)) complexity, where n is
the number of items in the database. Two exceptions are the
works by Doro¨z et al. [11] and Lipmaa [20], which provide log
and log-squared asymptotic complexities for communication,
respectively. An in-depth comparison of different schemes in
terms of computation and communication complexities are
provided in Section VII.
Due to its superior communicational complexity, we use
Lipmaa’s (n, 1) - CPIR protocol, BddCpir [20], as a starting
point. Binary decision diagrams (BDD) and an additively-
homomorphic public-key cryptosystem [9] are two important
building blocks in the BddCpir [20] scheme. In this section, we
provide the basics of the BDD and the Damga˚rd-Jurik cryp-
tosystem [9], which is an additively homomorphic encryption
scheme.
A. Binary Decision Diagrams and Homomorphic Encryption
A binary decision diagram is similar to binary trees, where
each node has at most two children except for leaf (sink or
terminal) nodes.
Properties of a BDD: In a binary decision diagram, non-sink
nodes are labeled as Ri,j , where i and j denotes the level (the
root is in the highest level) and the position of the node in
a level, respectively. Also, two outgoing edges of the internal
nodes are labeled as 0 or 1. The sink nodes, however, are data
items, whose indices are m-bit strings, representing the route
taken from the root node to a sink node, where m is the depth
of the tree. In other words it is the concatenation of the labels
of the edges that are visited while reaching the sink node from
the root node.
In BddCpir, data items in sink nodes are privately retrieved
on user inputs. Thus, the labels of the sink nodes are used
as indices to retrieve data items. More precisely, to retrieve
the data item fx, stored in the sink node with the label x of
length m-bit, the client includes x in his query to the server.
In Figure 1, the binary decision tree of depth two represents
a database with four data items, namely f0, f1, f2, f3.
In CPIR, to access a data item, its index is encrypted using
an additively-homomorphic public-key cryptosystem before it
R2,0
R1,1
f3f2
0 1
R1,0
f1f0
0 1
0 1
Figure 1. An example BDD constructed by the server, shows the case where
the client query is x = 01 to access file f1.
is sent to the server as will be explained in subsequent sections.
Similarly, the requested data item is returned also in ho-
momorphically encrypted form. An additively-homomorphic
public key cryptography algorithm satisfies the following
important homomorphic properties over encryption operation
E(x1) ·E(x2) = E(x1 + x2) and E(x1)c = E(c · x1), where
x1 and x2 are plaintext messages, and c is a constant.
Octal Trees: For performance reasons, instead of the binary
decision diagrams, we propose using octal trees in our proto-
col. This new type of tree has essentially the same properties as
the binary trees, except that internal nodes have eight children.
In fact, one can also use other trees with different number
of child nodes such as quadratic trees with four child nodes
as used in [29]. However, since the bandwidth advantage
of quadratic trees is rather marginal and octal trees offer
significant computational improvement, we focus our attention
on octal trees. In an octal tree, the edges of the internal nodes
are labeled by three-bit strings, namely {000, 001, . . . , 111}
and hence the labels of the sink nodes have 3m-bit strings,
where m again represents the depth of the tree.
B. (n, 1) - CPIR
In this section, we first explain the (2,1) CPIR sub-protocol,
which is the base of the (n, 1) CPIR scheme in [20]. Then,
we show how it is extended to a database with n items.
(2, 1) - CPIR: In (2,1)-CPIR protocol, the server holds only
two data items, namely {f0, f1}; therefore the client’s input x
is either 0 or 1 since it only requests one of {f0, f1}. The PIR
protocol ensures that the client receives fx while the server
obtains no information about x. In PIR, the files themselves
are not necessarily stored in encrypted form, while the client
receives the response in encrypted form, which requires a final
decryption by the client. (2, 1) - CPIR [20] works in four steps:
1) Client generates private and public keys (sk, pk); not
necessarily repeated for every execution of PIR.
2) Client computes c = Epk(x) (simply E(x) henceforth
since encryption is always performed using the public
key, pk) and sends (pk, c) to the server.
3) Server computes R = E(f0) ·cf1−f0 and sends R to the
client.
4) Client computes Dsk(R) (simply D(R) henceforth) to
find fx.
Since the cryptosystem used for encryption and decryption
is additively homomorphic we can prove that the client will
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get fx at the end of the protocol as
R = E (f0) · c f1−f0 = E (f0) · E (x) f1−f0
= E (f0 + x (f1 − f0)) = E (fx).
Extending (2, 1)-CPIR to (n, 1)-CPIR: The (2, 1)-CPIR
protocol can be used to construct the (n, 1) - CPIR protocol
for databases with n data items in the general case. Assuming
n being a power of two for sake of simplicity, the PIR
computation starts with sink nodes paired in two. Then, the
computation continues upward and stops at the root node. In
the end, the requested data item is obtained, which is encrypted
as many times as the depth of the tree.
Example 1: The server computation of the (4, 1)-CPIR
protocol for data items {f0, f1, f2, f3} is implemented for the
user input x = (x1, x0) in two steps as follows. In the first
step, we calculate
R1,0 = E (f0) · c f1−f00 and R1,1 = E (f2) · c f3−f20 ,
where c0 = E(x0). In the second step, we work with the
ciphertexts obtained from the previous step as
R1,0 = E (R1,0) · c R1,1−R1,01
= E (R1,0 + c1 · (R1,1 −R1,0))
= E (E (f0x0) + c1 · (E (f1x0)− E (f0x0))),
where c1 = E(2)(x1). Therefore, we obtain the double
encryption of fx, namely E(2)(fx), which is sent to the user.
In the general case, the client receives E(m) (fx), where m
is the depth of the binary tree. Note that ci = E(i+1)(xi) for
i = 0, . . . ,m− 1.
C. Damga˚rd - Jurik Cryptosystem
The Lipmaa’s CPIR [20] scheme suggests using an
additively-homomorphic public key encryption, which al-
lows multiple encryptions. The Paillier public key cryptosys-
tem [25] provides additive homomorphic property, however, it
cannot be used directly in (n, 1)-CPIR since it does not allow
encryption of a ciphertext. Therefore, the Damga˚rd-Jurick
public key cryptosystem [9], which is a generalization of the
Paillier scheme and provides multiple encryption property, is
used in the proposed scheme.
The Damga˚rd - Jurik cryptosystem uses a setting similar
to the RSA algorithm, where we work in a ring of integers
Z∗N , and N is the product of two large prime numbers,
p and q. The security of the Damga˚rd Jurik cryptosystem
relies on the decisional composite residuosity assumption [25],
which is also used in the Paillier cryptosystem. The encryption
algorithm, which is the most-time consuming part of the
proposed scheme, is performed as follows.
Given a plaintext m ∈ ZNs , we choose a random number
r ∈R Z∗Ns+1 and compute the ciphertext as E(m, r) =
gm rN
s
mod Ns+1, where g = N +1. For the key generation
and decryption operations, one can refer to [9].
The natural number s in the encryption operation changes
from 1 to m during the PIR computations. The encryptions in
the sink nodes are performed with s = 1, those in the second
level will be done with s = 2, and so on. Since s increments
as we move to upper nodes in the tree, the PIR calculations
become more costly in terms of computation.
Example 2: For a tree with 2m data items in its sink nodes,
the encrypted index values are formed as
ci = g
xi rN
i+1
i mod N
i+2,
where ri ∈R Z∗Ni+2 for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}.
Considering the quadratic complexity of the Damga˚rd-Jurik
encryption operation with respect to the modulus size, the
time complexity of the CPIR scheme will be prohibitively high
even for databases with moderately high number of data items.
The continuous message expansion with multiple encryptions
hinders the scalability of the CPIR scheme.
III. REQUIREMENTS OF EFFICIENT PIR
PIR protocols are designed to reduce bandwidth require-
ments which must be sublinear to the database size. In
oblivious transfer protocols [26, 30] the user is allowed to
retrieve at most one of the database items, which usually
results in that the number of bits exchanged between the server
and the user become larger than the database itself. Removing
this additional privacy requirement, PIR protocols can offer
more bandwidth efficient solutions.
The following performance metrics can be used to evaluate
the efficiency of a PIR protocol:
• Bandwidth Efficiency: The total size of a PIR query
and its response must be significantly smaller than the
database size. Thus, a good metric is the ratio of the
total size of the exchanged data to the database size. An
efficient PIR scheme should aim to optimize both query
and response sizes.
• Computational Efficiency: PIR protocols usually require
expensive cryptographic operations. Computational ef-
ficiency is expressed usually from the throughput per-
spective; namely the number of data items or database
size processed in a unit time. However, as users tolerate
waiting for only a limited amount of time for a query
processing, the latency is also important.
• Scalability: A PIR should scheme remain applicable as
the number of data items and/or database size increase.
PIR Schemes suitable to parallel implementations will
be advantageous for scalability. In this work, we propose
algorithms that benefit parallel implementations.
In the next section, we briefly introduce our key technique
that outperforms the original BddCpir scheme in terms of both
computational and bandwidth complexities.
IV. OUR APPROACH
We utilize three techniques to improve the scalability, com-
putational and bandwidth efficiency of the CPIR scheme. The
first technique involves using octal trees, which decreases the
tree depth. The second technique is the utilization of parallel
algorithms that take advantage of shared-memory multi-core
processors. And finally, the third technique is a hybrid scheme
which scales PIR to large databases with a relatively small
increase in the bandwidth requirement.
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Using other trees, such as quadratic and hexadecimal with
four and 16 child nodes, respectively, can also considered. For
instance, quadratic trees, given in Appendix A and analyzed
in [29] are slightly better than octal trees in terms of bandwidth
requirement (see Figure 2), but not as fast as octal trees.
Hexadecimal trees can offer computational advantages, but
suffer from high bandwidth requirement. We will focus on
octal tree-based solution, which provides a good balance
between the computational and communication complexity,
and give results for the other trees occasionally for comparison
purposes.
A. (n,1)-CPIR using Octal Tree
Octal tree decreases the depth, which helps improve the
complexity of the overall system; particularly the complexity
of cryptographic operations when the number of data items is
high. While the number of indices sent by the user is increased,
using octal trees, in fact, improves the overall bandwidth even
for relatively large databases due to their shallow depth.
Assuming that the number of nodes is a power of 8, namely
n = 8m, the client sets his private and public keys (sk, pk)
and computes
c3s−3 = E
(s)(x3s−3), c3s−2 = E
(s)(x3s−2),
c3s−1 = E
(s)(x3s−1),
c3s−3,3s−2 = E
(s)(x3s−3 · x3s−2),
c3s−3,3s−1 = E
(s)(x3s−3 · x3s−1),
c3s−2,3s−1 = E
(s)(x3s−2 · x3s−1),
c3s−3,3s−2,3s−1 = E
(s)(x3s−3 · x3s−2 · x3s−1)
for s = 1, . . . ,m and sends them and pk to the server. The
details of the server computation are given in Algorithm 5 in
Appendix B. The server finally obtains Rm,0 and sends it to
the client. The client performs the decryption D(m)(Rm,0) to
retrieve fx.
Example 3: For an octal tree with a total of eight sink nodes
(i.e., data items), the client sends ci = E(xi), for i ∈ {0, 1, 2},
c0,1 = E(x0 · x1), c0,2 = E(x0 · x2), c1,2 = E(x1 · x2),
and c0,1,2 = E(x0 · x1 · x2) to the server that computes the
following:
R1,0 =E(f0) · cf1−f00 · cf2−f01 · cf4−f02
· cf3+f0−f2−f10,1 · cf5+f0−f4−f10,2
· cf6+f0−f2−f41,2 · cf7−f6−f5−f3−f0+f4+f2+f10,1,2 .
B. A Parallel Algorithm for Server-Side Computation
In this section, we introduce a highly efficient parallel
algorithm for server side computations of the (n,1) CPIR
scheme. The client can encrypt selection bits in parallel as their
encryptions are independently performed. Therefore, client
side computations can be accelerated by a trivial parallel
algorithm when multiple cores are available. On the other
hand, server-side computations, composed of both parallel and
sequential operations, can lead to different parallel algorithms.
A serial algorithm for server-side computations using a
binary tree-based (n, 1)-CPIR is given in Algorithm 1. As
can be observed from the serial algorithm, the operations in a
level in the decision tree are independent from each other and
can be performed in parallel. In addition, the homomorphic
encryption operation in each level of the tree consists of two
modular exponentiation operations (i.e., gm mod Ns+1 and
rN
s
mod Ns+1) that can also be calculated in parallel.
Algorithm 1 SerCPIR(C, F): Serial algorithm for server-side
computation for binary tree-based (n,1)-CPIR
Require: C = {c0, . . . , cm−1} and F = {f0, . . . , f2m−1}
Ensure: Rm,0
1: for j ← 0 to 2m − 1 do
2: R0,j ← fj
3: end for
4: for s← 1 to m do
5: for j ← 0 to 2m−s − 1 do
6: f0 ← Rs−1,2j
7: f1 ← Rs−1,2j+1
8: Rs,j ← E(s)(f0) · cf1−f0s−1 mod Ns+1
9: end for
10: end for
11: return Rm,0
For parallelization of server-side computations, all inde-
pendent operations in a level can be performed concurrently
starting from the leaf nodes as proposed in Algorithm 1 in [29].
However, this approach suffers from increased number of
synchronization points; namely the cores have to communicate
more frequently, and therefore block waiting for each other.
The proposed parallel algorithm, depicted in Algorithm 2 on
the other hand, divides the binary tree into as many subtrees
as the number of available cores assuming that the number
of cores is a power of 2 (i.e., 2κ) and less than the number
of data items (i.e., 2m) in the database. Each processor core,
then, works on the assigned subtree in isolation (cf. Step 5 of
Algorithm 2). When each core finishes its portion of the task,
the cores synchronize and start working with the upper levels
of the tree concurrently (cf. Steps 7–17 of Algorithm 2). As can
be observed from Steps 7–17 of the algorithm, there are two
levels of parallelism. First, the computation of Rs,j values are
distributed among the available cores in the first level while the
two exponentiations needed for each Rs,j are also distributed
in the second level (cf. Steps 11–14 of Algorithm 2). This
implies a finer parallelization in the second level, which is
more meaningful for the computations in the top levels of the
tree. In [29], this technique is used for the entire tree, which
results in a slower implementation. Algorithm 2 reduces the
number of the synchronization points as will be discussed in
detail in Section IV-C.
C. Analysis of Computational Complexity
In this section, we explain the advantages of octal tree
implementations when compared with binary tree implemen-
tations. The theoretical analysis in this section clearly shows
that server-side computations can be accelerated considerably
when implemented using Algorithm 2. Furthermore, the the-
oretical analysis yields expected speedup values, which are
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Algorithm 2 Parallel algorithm for server-side computation
for binary tree based (n,1)-CPIR
Require: C = {c0, . . . , cm−1}, F = {f0, . . . , f2m−1}, and
κ < m
Ensure: Rm,0
1: δ ← 2m−κ
2: Cm−κ−10 ← {c0, . . . , cm−κ−1}
3: for j ← 0 to 2κ − 1 in parallel do
4: F jδ+δ−1jδ ← {fjδ, . . . , fjδ+δ−1}
5: Rm−κ,j ← SerCPIR(Cm−κ−10 , F jδ+δ−1jδ )
6: end parallel for
7: for s← m− κ+ 1 to m do
8: for j ← 0 to 2m−s − 1 in parallel do
9: f0 ← Rs−1,2j
10: f1 ← Rs−1,2j+1
11: in parallel do
12: u0 ← E(s)(f0)
13: u1 ← cf1−f0s−1 mod Ns+1
14: sync
15: Rs,j ← u1 · u0 mod Ns+1
16: end parallel for
17: end for
18: return Rm,0
not exact, but useful to provide an upper bound for the actual
speedup values. Section VI provides the actual implementation
results.
When Algorithm 2 is inspected, one can observe that two
fundamental operations are performed: the Damga˚rd-Jurik
encryption and modular exponentiation. Also, the Damga˚rd-
Jurik encryption consists of two modular exponentiations.
Therefore, Algorithm 2 consists of many modular exponen-
tiation operation, whose complexity is quadratic with the bit
length of the modulus (i.e., Ns+1).
If we assume that a 1,024-bit modular exponentiation takes
τ seconds (i.e., dlog2(N)e = 1024), then we can conclude
that an exponentiation with s = 1 (i.e., in the sink nodes) are
expected to take time proportional to τ1 = 4τ seconds since
we work with modulo N2. And the cost of exponentiation can
be assumed to increase quadratically as we move to the upper
level nodes in the tree. For the general case, in the sth level of
the tree, one exponentiation takes expectedly τs = (s+1)2 · τ
if we strictly use the quadratic complexity assumption.
Three and nine exponentiations are performed for every
node in binary and octal trees, respectively. For a node in
the sth level, we can adopt the following formulas for the
computation complexity, tbs = 3·τs and tos = 9·τs, respectively
for binary and octal trees. Then, the overall time complexity
of binary and octal trees can be estimated using the following
formulas
T2m =
m∑
s=1
2m−stbs for m ≥ 1
T8m =
m∑
s=1
8m−stos for m ≥ 1, (1)
where m is the depth of the corresponding tree. Relying on the
assumption of the quadratic complexity of modular exponen-
tiation operation with respect to the bit length of the modulus
in homomorphic encryption, we can compute the expected
speedup values between different tree implementations.
Example 4: For n = 512 (e.g., m = 9 and m = 3 for binary
and octal trees, respectively), using the quadratic complexity
assumption, the exponentiations in different levels of the tree
take τ1 = 4τ , τ2 = 9τ , . . ., τ9 = 300τ seconds. Using the
formulas in Eq. 1, we calculate T2m = 16, 458τ s and T8m =
3, 096τ s. Thus, the octal tree implementation is expected to
achieve a speedup of about 16,458τ3,096τ ≈ 5.32 over the binary
tree implementation.
As we will show in Section VI, the actual speedup for
this case will be over 10. There are two reasons for this
discrepancy. Firstly, in our estimations we use the asymptotic
complexity of modular exponentiations which does not exactly
reflect the actual execution time of the modular exponentiation
for a specific operand length. Secondly, the big integer libraries
employ specific optimization techniques based on architectural
properties of the underlying microprocessor for relatively low
bit sizes. As the bit size increases, it becomes difficult to use
the same optimization techniques. For example, we incur a
severe memory latency due to the fact that we cannot keep
the operands in registers when the operands become large.
See Figure 7 in Appendix C for the actual timing values of
exponentiations with different modulus lengths.
Using the actual timing values for exponentiation operations
on an Intel Xeon CPU E1650 processor operating at 3.50 GHz,
we estimate the execution times of server-side computations
for various number of data items, and enumerate the results
in Table I. As can be observed from the table, the expected
speedup of using octal tree is about 11.76 when the number
of items is 32,768. Note that the estimated timings listed in
Table I are sufficiently close to the actual timings enumerated
in Table VI, which shows the accuracy of our timing model,
captured in Eq. 1.
Number of Server Computation (ms)
Items binary octal
2 4.2 -
4 26.4 -
8 97.8 12.6
16 279.6 -
32 703.2 -
64 1,628 154.8
128 3,566 -
256 7,564 -
512 15,700 1,373
4,096 131,490 11,239
32,768 1,062,800 90,346
Table I
ESTIMATED TIMINGS OF SERVER-SIDE COMPUTATION (USING GMP
LIBRARY ON AN INTEL XEON CPU E1650@3.50 GHZ)
1) Complexity of Parallel Implementation of Binary Tree:
In this and the next sections, we provide a theoretical analysis
for the complexity of the proposed parallel algorithms for
two different tree-based CPIRs. We will use two metrics to
evaluate the efficiency of the parallel algorithms: i) expected
execution time excluding the synchronization overhead and
ii) the number and costs of synchronization points. For the
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expected execution time we use the timing model introduced
in Eq. 1 while we do not take into account the time spent
in synchronization points, which is practically impossible to
model in real systems. Therefore, our estimations for expected
execution times in this section will be always less than the ac-
tual timing values in Section VI. Nevertheless, the estimations
can be profitably utilized to predict speedups gained through
parallelization; in the worst case we can predict if there is
a speedup using the estimations with certain accuracy and
compare different parallel algorithms.
The second metric is the number and costs of synchroniza-
tion points, during which the processor cores synchronize and
possibly exchange data. Naturally, an efficient parallel algo-
rithm minimizes the number and costs of the synchronization
points. For instance, Step 14 of Algorithm 2 indicates that two
cores computing Steps 12 and 13 have to synchronize since in
Step 15, the multiplication operation needs both u0 and u1 that
are computed by two different cores. For example, one core
sends u1 to the other core that has u0 and can now perform
the multiplication in Step 15 of Algorithm 2. Therefore, we
need to count these and similar other synchronization points
in our analysis.
The cost of a synchronization point, not considered as a
separate metric, is related to the amount of data transferred
from one core to the other(s) in a synchronization point. While
it is true that multicore processors use a shared-memory model
whereby cores can access the same address space, each core
works with data in its own level-1 cache most of the time.
Thus, a cache coherency protocol [16] transfers data between
the caches of cores when a core needs the data generated
by another core. Since the transfer takes place in a system
bus at a certain bandwidth, the amount of transferred data
affects the time spent in the synchronization point. In the CPIR
protocol, as computation proceeds to the upper levels of the
tree, the amount of data transferred in each synchronization
point increases as well. For instance, the synchronization
operation in Step 14 of Algorithm 2 requires the transfer of
u1 (or u0) from one core to the other and the size u1 depends
on the current level of the tree, namely, s. For example, if we
use a 1,024-bit modulus in our Damga˚rd-Jurik algorithm with
|N |-bit modulus, the size of u1 is |2N |-bit and |3N |-bit for
s = 1 and s = 2, respectively. We quantify the cost of each
synchronization points by the value of s in our analysis.
We start our analysis by estimating the execution time of
Algorithm 2 for the binary tree. Assuming that 2κ is the
number of cores and m ≥ κ ≥ 0, where 2m is the number of
data items, we can obtain the following formula for the time
model of the operations at the server side
T p2m = T2σ +
m∑
s=σ+1
d2σ−s · 3eτs, (2)
where
σ =
{
m− κ m ≥ κ
0 otherwise.
For the number of synchronization points, we can have the
following formula
S2m =


2κ +
κ−1∑
s=1
2κ−1−s +
κ−1∑
s=1
2κ−s m > κ
2m +
m∑
s=2
2m−s +
m∑
s=2
2m−s+1 m = κ
m∑
s=1
2m−s +
m∑
s=1
2m−s+1 m < κ.
(3)
The total cost of synchronization points can be estimated using
the formula
CS2m =


2κ−1 · κ + 2κ−1 · (κ + 1)+
κ−1∑
s=1
2κ−1−s(κ + s)+
κ−1∑
s=1
2κ−s(κ + 1 + s) m > κ
2m−1 + 2m−1 · 2 +
m∑
s=2
2m−s · s+
m∑
s=2
2m−s+1 · (s+ 1) m = κ
m∑
s=1
2m−s · s+
m∑
s=1
2m−s+1 · (s+ 1) m < κ,
(4)
where κ = m− κ+ 1.
Using Eqs. 2, 3, 4, we can calculate the estimated expected
execution times and the total number and the total cost of
synchronization points for different tree sizes and for different
number of process cores. Translating the numbers and costs
of synchronization points into actual time estimations is not
attempted since the underlying processor technologies adopt
different architectures, techniques and algorithms for cache
coherency, which renders any estimation inaccurate. The re-
sults are given in Table II, where the execution times are
in milliseconds. The timing estimations in Table II should
be taken into account along with the number and costs of
synchronization points. For example, when the number of
items is only 64, the gain in the expected execution times
diminishes with the number of cores while the number and
costs of synchronization points grow very fast. Consequently,
we can conclude that using more cores can deteriorate the
performance if the number of items is not too high. Using
an excessively high number of cores benefits only very large
trees.
2) Complexity of Parallel Implementation of Octal Tree: In
this section, we provide our analysis for the expected execution
time, the total number and the total cost of synchronization
points in the octal tree case. Suppose that 8m is the number
of data items, c is the number of cores and λ = dlog8 ce. Then
we have
T p8m =
⌈
8λ
c
⌉
T8σ +
m∑
s=σ+1
⌈
8m−s · 9
c
⌉
τs, (5)
where
σ =
{
m− λ m ≥ λ
0 otherwise.
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Perf. No. of Cores (l)
No. Metrics 1 4 8 16 32
of no. of
- 7 17 37 77Items synch.
64 Time (ms) 1,628 450 276 206 181
syn. cost - 48 132 320 720
128 Time (ms) 3,566 954 553 379 309
syn. cost - 56 156 384 880
256 Time (ms) 7,564 1,978 1,098 697 523
syn. cost - 64 180 448 1,040
512 Time (ms) 15,700 4,045 2,169 1,289 888
syn. cost - 72 204 512 1,200
4,096 Time (ms) 131,490 33,119 16,870 8,873 4,972
syn. cost - 96 276 704 1,680
Table II
ESTIMATION OF TIMING VALUES FOR SERIAL (WITH ONE CORE) AND
PARALLEL IMPLEMENTATIONS WITH DIFFERENT NUMBER OF PROCESSOR
CORES (WITH 4, 8, 16 AND 32 CORES) AND NUMBER OF
SYNCHRONIZATION POINTS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED COSTS - BINARY
TREE CASE (USING GMP LIBRARY ON AN INTEL XEON CPU
E1650@3.50 GHZ)
For the number of synchronization points, we can derive the
following formula
S8m =


2 · ϑ+ 15 ·
λ−1∑
s=1
8λ−1−s m ≥ λ and c > 0
15 · 8m−1 + 15 ·
m−1∑
s=1
8m−1−s m < λ,
(6)
where ϑ = 8λ−1 · α · (2β − 1), α = 8
λ
c
, and β = log2
c
8λ−1
.
The total cost of synchronization points can be computed
using the formula
CS8m =


ϑ · %+ ϑ · (%+ 1)+
7 ·
λ−1∑
s=1
8λ−1−s · (%+ s)
8 ·
λ−1∑
s=1
8λ−1−s · (%+ 1 + s) m ≥ λ and c > 0
23 · 8m−1+
7 ·
m−1∑
s=1
8m−1−s · (s+ 1)
8 ·
m−1∑
s=1
8m−1−s · (s+ 2) m < λ,
(7)
where % = m− λ+ 1.
Using Eqs. 5, 6, 7, the estimated expected execution times,
and the total number and the total cost of synchronization
points for different tree sizes and different number of process
cores are calculated and tabulated in Table III.
D. Analysis of Communication Complexity
In this section, we analyze the bandwidth requirements
of the proposed scheme based on octal trees and explain
why it can be better than the binary tree-based approach.
A bandwidth-efficient PIR scheme requires exchanging of
much less data between the user and the server compared
to the database size. Formally speaking, the bandwidth of a
Perf. No. of Cores (c)
No. Metrics 1 4 8 16 32
of no. of
- 12 14 79 111Items synch.
64 Est. Time (ms) 155 43 25 13 10
syn. cost - 30 35 134 182
512 Est. Time (ms) 1,373 355 185 95 58
syn. cost - 42 49 213 293
4,096 Est. Time (ms) 11,239 2,831 1,429 722 383
syn. cost - 54 63 292 404
Table III
ESTIMATION OF TIMING VALUES FOR SERIAL (WITH ONE CORE) AND
PARALLEL IMPLEMENTATIONS WITH DIFFERENT NUMBER OF PROCESSOR
CORES (WITH 4, 8, 16 AND 32 CORES) AND NUMBER OF
SYNCHRONIZATION POINTS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED COSTS - OCTAL TREE
CASE (USING GMP LIBRARY ON AN INTEL XEON CPU
E1650@3.50 GHZ)
PIR scheme must be sublinear to the size of the database.
The bandwidth of the PIR scheme [20], independent of the
tree type used, has log-square complexity. However, actual
implementations using different trees have different bandwidth
requirements, which turns out to be important in practice.
In the PIR protocol, the client sends encrypted selection bits
to the server in the first phase and receives the encrypted data
item in the second phase. In binary decision tree, the number
of selection bits is dlog2 ne, where n is the number of data
items in the database. Assuming fi < N for all data items and
|N | is the size of the modulus N , the size of the encrypted
selection bit for the lowest level of the tree, c0 = E(x0), is
2|N |-bit due to message expansion property of the Damga˚rd-
Jurik encryption. The selection bit for the second level c1 =
E(2)(x1), therefore, will be 3|N |-bit long. In more general
case, the selection bit for the sth-level, cs−1 = E(s)(x1) will
be (s+ 1)|N |-bit long.
The proposed CPIR schemes based on octal trees require 7
selection bits for each level of the tree. This is less efficient
than BddCpir, which requires only a single bit for one level.
On the other hand, octal trees are more shallow than binary
trees; thus it is not immediately clear as to which scheme offers
the best bandwidth efficiency. This calls for a more detailed
inspection of the bandwidth requirement of each scheme.
The binary and octal trees have log2 n, and log8 n levels,
respectively. In the most general case, for a tree in which each
non-sink node has 2x child nodes the bandwidth requirements
for the encrypted selection bits can be written as
[(2x − 1) · (2 + 3 + . . .+ (dlog2x ne+ 1))] · |N |.
The size of the response, which contains the requested
data item in encrypted form, is also important since this is a
part of the exchanged messages. The bandwidth requirement
of the response message sent by the server to the user is
m + 1 · |N | bits, where m = dlog2x ne is the depth of the
corresponding tree.
The overall communication cost, namely the total size of
encrypted indexes and the response of a PIR query, is tabulated
in Table IV for different database sizes. The quadratic tree im-
plementation always provide the best bandwidth performance
for all database sizes. The octal tree implementation is only
slightly worse than the binary case for the database sizes in
Table IV. However, the octal tree will eventually be better than
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the binary tree as the database size increases. For instance, for
a database with n = 4, 096 data items, where each data item
is 1 Kbit in length, the number of bits exchanged will be the
same, namely 105,472 bits, for both cases. But, for a larger
database with n = 32, 768 data items where the size of items
is 1 Kbit, the bandwidth performance of the octal tree is better
than the binary tree. Trees with higher number of child nodes
n Database size binary quadratic octal
2 2,048 4,096 - -
4 4,096 8,192 8,192 -
8 8,192 13,312 - 16,384
16 16,384 19,456 18,432 -
32 32,768 26,624 - -
64 65,536 34,816 31,744 38,912
128 131,072 44,032 - -
256 262,144 54,272 48,128 -
512 524,288 65,536 - 68,608
Table IV
ACTUAL COSTS OF OVERALL COMMUNICATION FOR DIFFERENT
DATABASE SIZES (IN NUMBER OF BITS) AND dlog2(N)e = 1024.
suffer from high communication rates as discussed below.
We enumerate the total number of exchanged bits for larger
number of data items and depicted the results in Figure 2.
The figure demonstrates that quadratic and octal trees are
superior than the binary in terms of bandwidth requirements
for the number of items of practical interest (from 4,096 to
236 data items). We also depict the bandwidth requirements of
hexadecimal trees, in which non-sink nodes have 16 children,
in Figure 2. As can be observed from the figure, using trees
with larger number of child nodes will be inferior to bi-
nary tree implementation in terms of bandwidth requirements.
Therefore, we focus our investigations on octal trees only.
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Figure 2. Total number of exchanged bits in different types of trees
V. HYBRID CPIR FOR PARALLEL IMPLEMENTATIONS
In this section, we present a hybrid method that is ad-
vantageous for larger databases. As can be understood from
the previous discussions, the server-side computation becomes
very complicated as a result of the increasing difficulty of
performing encryptions in higher levels of the tree as the tree
gets deeper. In addition, the parallel processing is of no sig-
nificant assistance since the computation proceeds sequentially
from the bottom to the top of the tree. Therefore, we propose
a modified version of CPIR that takes advantage of parallel
processing, and allows the scheme to scale to a large number
of data items provided that many-core processors are available.
The new scheme, based on partitioning the tree into smaller,
equal size, subtrees, is described in Algorithms 3 and 4. In the
algorithms, 2m and 2l stand for the numbers of data items in
the entire tree and in each of the subtrees, respectively. The
number of subtrees, µ = 2m−l, is determined depending on
the performance requirements.
In Algorithm 3, the client-side operations are described. The
user encrypts a separate selection bit (ςj in Algorithm 3) for
each subtree, and the selection bit is 1 for the subtree that
contains the requested data item, and 0 otherwise. Note that
the number of index bits is now l < m. The user sends the
homomorphically encrypted index and selection bits to the
server, which in turn uses Algorithm 4 to retrieve the encrypted
version of the requested data item, Rl,0. For appropriate values
of m and l, the new method can be beneficial as we will show
later in this section and Section VI.
Algorithm 3 Client-side computation for binary tree-based
Hybrid CPIR
Require: m, l, and x = xl−1 . . . x1, x0
Ensure: {c1, . . . , cl−1} and {ς0, . . . , ς2m−l−1}
1: µ← 2m−l
2: ζ ← xm−1, . . . , xl
3: for i← 0 to µ− 1 do
4: if i 6= ζ then
5: ςi ← E(0)
6: else
7: ςi ← E(1)
8: end if
9: end for
10: for s← 1 to l do
11: cs−1 ← E(s+1)(xs−1)
12: end for
13: return {c0, . . . , cl−1} and {ς0, . . . , ςµ−1}
The first phase of Algorithm 4, in which server-side opera-
tions are described, collapses the subtrees to a single subtree
as described in Steps 1–10. As a result, we obtain a single
subtree whose depth is l. Then, the resulting subtree, which
contains the desired data item, is divided among the processor
cores, which process their portions of the subtree in isolation
(cf. Steps 11–24). Finally, the processor cores join and start
computing the upper part of the subtree collaboratively (cf.
Steps 25–35). An example of the hybrid CPIR scheme is
provided in Appendix D.
A. Communication Complexity of the Hybrid CPIR
The new hybrid CPIR incurs an overhead in communication
complexity due to the additional selection bits that are sent to
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Algorithm 4 Server-side computation for binary tree-based
Hybrid CPIR
Require: m, C = {c0, . . . , cm−1}, F = {f0, . . . , f2m−1},
{ς0, . . . , ς2m−l}, l and κ < l
Ensure: Rm,0
. Collapsing subtrees into one subtree
1: µ = 2m−l . No. of subtrees
2: γ = 2l−κ
3: for j ← 0 to 2κ − 1 in parallel do
4: for i← 0 to γ − 1 do
5: R0,jγ+i = E(ς0)fjγ
6: for k ← 0 to µ− 1 do
7: R0,jγ+i ← R0,jγ+i ·E(ςk)fjγ+(µ−1)2l mod N2
8: end for
9: end for
10: end parallel for
. Cores computing in the collapsed subtree in isolation
11: δ ← 2l−κ . Number of data items assigned to a core
12: for j ← 0 to 2κ − 1 in parallel do
13: for i← 0 to δ − 1 do
14: R˜0,i ← R0,jδ+i
15: end for
16: for s← 1 to l − κ do
17: for i← 0 to 2l−s − 1 do
18: f0 ← R˜s−1,2i
19: f1 ← R˜s−1,2i+1
20: R˜s,j ← E(s+1)(f0)× cf1−f0s−1 mod Ns+2
21: end for
22: end for
23: Rl−κ,j ← R˜l−κ,0
24: end parallel for
. Cores join
25: for s← l − κ+ 1 to l do
26: for j ← 0 to 2l−s − 1 in parallel do
27: f0 ← Rs−1,2j
28: f1 ← Rs−1,2j+1
29: in parallel do
30: t0 ← E(s+1)(f0)
31: t1 ← cf1−f0s−1 mod Ns+2
32: sync
33: Rs,j ← t1 · t0 mod Ns+2
34: end parallel for
35: end for
36: return Rl,0
the server (in addition to the index bits). The formula for the
number of bits sent to the server by the user can be given as
BW = (2µ+ (2x − 1) · (3 + 4 + . . .+ (l + 2)))|N |,
where BW stands for the bandwidth, l is the depth of the
corresponding subtree, µ = 2m−x·l is the number of data items
in each subtree (l < m, where 2m is the number of data
items in the entire tree). Finally, x is 1 and 3 for binary and
octal trees, respectively, while N is the modulus used in the
Damga˚rd-Jurik cryptosystem. On the other hand, the number
of bits sent by the server to the user will be (l + 2) · |N |.
The effects of the octal version of the hybrid solution in the
bandwidth requirements are illustrated in Figure 3. From the
figure, we conclude that the effect can be made negligible if
the size of the subtrees 2l for a given m is selected carefully.
We also observe a similar effect on binary and quadratic trees.
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Figure 3. Octal Tree Case: Ratio of exchanged number of bits to database
size for |N | = 1024, l = 3, 4.
Appendix E provides our estimates for the expected exe-
cution times of the hybrid scheme based on the time model
introduced in Section IV-C. The actual execution times are
given in Sections VI-B3 and VI-B4.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
We implemented both the serial and the parallel versions
of all CPIR schemes based on binary, quadratic, and oc-
tal trees using C++ programming language with the GMP
library optimized for big number arithmetic. For parallel
implementations we used the OpenMP API that allows shared-
memory multiprocessing programming. In the first platform
used in the implementations, which is a computer featuring
six cores, with hyper-threading support running 64-bit Ubuntu
Linux 12.04 operating system, we utilize a maximum of four
parallel threads in our implementations for the first set of
experiments. Each core is an Intel Xeon CPU E1650 operating
at 3.50 GHz. Finally, we used a 1,024-bit modulus, providing
80-bit equivalent security. We also included the timing results
on two separate computing platforms that feature 16 and 30
cores, respectively to demonstrate that our claims for the
scalability of the proposed schemes are justified.
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A. Client-Side Computations
The client performs encryption operations for building the
secure indexes (i.e., encrypted selection bits) and one decryp-
tion operation to retrieve the requested data item. Encryptions
are parallelized while the decryption, which is relatively a
simple operation, is performed in serial. For the three cases,
the results are given in Table V. As can be observed, the CPIR
implementations based on quadratic and octal trees offer an
obvious advantage over the binary tree implementation as far
as the client-side computations are concerned.
No. of
Items
Client Encryption (ms) Client Decryption (ms)
binary quad oct binary quad oct
2 2 - - 2 - -
4 7 2 - 5 2 -
8 19 - 5 11 - 2
16 34 10 - 19 5 -
32 55 - - 30 - -
64 78 24 19 41 11 5
128 114 - - 58 - -
256 151 45 - 78 18 -
512 200 - 48 102 - 10
1,024 257 99 - 130 28 -
2,048 324 - - 163 - -
4,096 416 155 93 200 41 18
32,768 - - 197 - - 28
Table V
TIMINGS OF CLIENT’S SELECTION BIT ENCRYPTIONS AND THE
DECRYPTION OF THE FINAL RESULT
B. Server-Side Computations
The server-side computations constitute the most time-
and resource-consuming part of all CPIR schemes since all
data items have to be processed before the requested one is
selected out. Therefore, the computation complexity is directly
a function of the database size. On the other hand, some of
the involved operations are often independent and therefore,
can be performed in parallel. In what follows, we present the
timing results for both serial (cf. Algorithm 1) and parallel
(cf. Algorithm 2) implementations and demonstrate that the
proposed CPIR schemes take advantage of parallel processing.
1) Serial Case: In serial implementation based on Algo-
rithm 1, a single thread is used to implement server side
computations of the three CPIR schemes and the results are
enumerated in the left hand side of Table VI. The table
shows that we can achieve speedups of up to 161671580 = 10.23
for a database with 512 data items. As the number of data
items increases one should expect similar speedup values. For
instance, for a database of 4,096 items, the speedup will be
135,249
12,052 = 11.22.
2) Parallel Case: We implemented Algorithm 2 and tabu-
lated the results in the right hand side of Table VI. Obviously,
parallel computation on shared-memory multicore computing
platforms benefits all CPIR schemes and the benefit of par-
allelization is more pronounced when the number of data
items is high. For example, with 512 data items, we can
achieve a speedup of 1, 580/407 = 3.88 for the octal tree
CPIR and 16, 167/4, 551 = 3.55 for binary tree case, whereas
in 4,096-item database case, the speedup of the octal tree
Server Computation (ms) Server Computation (ms)
No. of Sequential Parallel
items binary quad oct binary quad oct
2 5 - - 5 - -
4 28 8 - 23 4 -
8 102 - 16 61 - 6
16 292 67 - 138 27 -
32 730 - - 289 - -
64 1,682 353 182 566 111 58
128 3,683 - - 1,138 - -
256 7,786 1,566 - 2,282 407 -
512 16,167 - 1,580 4,551 - 407
1,024 32,053 6,025 - 9,063 1,621 -
2,048 67,141 - - 18,076 - -
4,096 135,249 24,432 12,052 36,039 6,459 3,199
32,768 - - 96,966 - - 25,409
Table VI
TIMINGS OF SERVER COMPUTATION
method is 12, 052/3, 199 = 3.77, and that of binary version
is 135, 249/36, 039 = 3.75.
With the CPIR schemes we cannot achieve the ideal
speedup, which is equal to the number of cores in the
computing platform, since the parallelism becomes weaker in
the topmost levels of the decision tree, where the encryption
operation is the hardest.
From the binary tree serial implementation to the octal tree
parallel implementation, the achieved speedup is 135,2493,199 =
42.28 for a database with 4,096 items. In Table VI, for 4096
items, the decrease in times between binary and quadratic trees
is much more important then the decrease between quadratic
and octal tree based approaches. This is expected since from
binary to quadratic tree the depth is halved (from 12 to 6)
while from quadratic to octal tree the decrease in the depth is
more modest (from 6 to 4).
If we use eight threads to better utilize all the computa-
tional power of the underlying computing platform (which
can support up to 12 threads on its hyperthreaded six-core
architecture), we can further accelerate the computations. For
instance, for a database with 4,096 data items, the execution
time decreases from 3,199 ms to 2,955 ms. Therefore, from
the binary tree serial implementation to the octal tree parallel
implementation with eight threads, the achieved speedup will
be 135,2492,955 = 45.16. This is an important improvement that
brings CPIR schemes one step closer to practical usage.
Our preliminary theoretical analysis shows that the proposed
schemes show weak scalability in parallel implementations.
Namely, using more computational power (i.e., higher number
of processor cores) benefits larger databases with more data
items. On the other hand, a higher number of cores can also
be beneficial for databases with moderately small sizes.
3) Hybrid CPIR with Octal Trees: We obtained the actual
timing results of the hybrid CPIR introduced in Section V.
For a subtree size of 512 (i.e., l = 3), server-side computations
take 2,850 and 17,300 ms for databases with 4,096 and 32,768
items, respectively. When the size of subtree is 4,096 (i.e.,
l = 4), server-side computation take 22,600 ms for a database
with 32,768 data items.
From these timing results, we can observe that smaller
subtrees produce the best results for big databases. However,
there is a trade off between the computational and communi-
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cation costs, whereby smaller subtrees increase the bandwidth
requirements as shown in Section V. In short, for large octal
trees, when the hybrid CPIR is used, we can achieve a speedup
up to 25,40917,330 = 1.47 over the parallel implementation with a
relatively slight increase in the bandwidth requirement.
4) Implementation Results on 16 and 30-Cores Shared-
Memory Computers with Octal Trees: In order to demonstrate
that the proposed parallel algorithms scale well with the in-
creasing number of data items, we ported our implementations
to two computer platforms with 16 and 30-cores, respectively.
The first 16-core computing platform features two Intel
Sandybridge-EP CPUs clocked at 2.0 GHz and 256 GB of
RAM memory split across two NUMA domains. NUMA
stands for non-uniform memory access, and it is a memory
design for multi-processor computing platforms where the
access time depends on the memory location relative to the
processor, from which the access is originated. Each CPU has
eight-cores and HyperThreading is enabled. Each core has its
own 32 KB L1 and 256 KB L2 caches. The 8 cores on a CPU
share a 20 MB L3 cache. The machine runs 64-bit Debian
with Linux kernel.We run the parallel and the hybrid versions
of the octal tree-based implementations and enumerated the
execution times in Tables VII and VIII, respectively.
No. of No. of Cores
Items 1 2 4 8 16
8 20 11 7 5 8
64 245 128 71 44 55
512 2,165 1,100 570 330 262
4,096 17,740 8,914 4,508 2,545 1,492
32,768 142,564 71,660 35,985 20,150 10,774
Table VII
EXECUTION TIMES OF THE PARALLEL IMPLEMENTATION IN
MILLISECONDS FOR VARIOUS NUMBER OF DATA ITEMS AND NUMBER OF
CORES ON A 16-CORE COMPUTER PLATFORM.
Table VII shows that the execution times decrease as the
number of cores utilized on 16-core machine increases. The
speedup values are very close to the number of cores employed
in the calculation of CPIR when the number of items is
sufficiently high. For instance, we are able to obtain speedup
values of 7.07 and 13.23 for 8 and 16-core implementations,
respectively, when the number of items is 32,768. Although
the computing platform is a multiprocessor systems, in which
inter-core communication can be more expensive than single-
chip multi-core platforms, we are still able to obtain speedup
values that commensurate with the number of cores employed.
This is due to the fact that the proposed algorithms are
designed to decrease to the number of synchronization points
as explained in Section IV-C.
In Table VIII, the time performance of the hybrid implemen-
tation for various subtree sizes is listed. As can be observed,
with a small increase in the bandwidth usage we can obtain
significant improvements over server-side execution times.
The second computing platform features 30 cores running
64 bit CentOS 6.5, where each core is an Intel Xeon CPU
E7-4870 v2 clocked at 2.30 GHz. Each CPU has 15 cores
and HyperThreading is enabled. Each core has its own 32 KB
L1 and 256 KB L2 caches. The 15 cores on a CPU share a
No. of Subtree No. of Cores
Items Size 1 2 4 8 16
4096 64 9.63 4.87 2.46 1.38 0.84512 12.52 6.55 3.21 1.81 1.16
32768
64 74.31 37.32 18.68 10.45 5.57
512 77.23 38.79 19.44 10.89 5.88
4,096 100.52 50.58 25.37 14.22 7.74
Table VIII
EXECUTION TIMES OF THE HYBRID METHOD IN SECONDS FOR VARIOUS
NUMBER OF DATA ITEMS, SUBTREE SIZES, AND NUMBER OF CORES ON A
16-CORE COMPUTER PLATFORM.
30 MB L3 cache. A total of 64 GB of RAM memory split
across two NUMA domains. We also increased the number of
items in the database to 218 and tabulated the timing results in
Table IX. The timing results show that we obtain significant
speedup values for 30 cores over 16 cores.
No. of Subtree No. of Cores
Items Size 1 2 4 8 16 30
4,096 64 9.14 4.63 2.31 1.17 0.67 0.58512 11.88 6.02 3.03 1.54 0.88 0.76
32,768
64 70.44 35.46 17.68 8.86 4.51 3.20
512 73.26 36.82 18.45 9.23 4.72 3.36
4096 95.44 48.03 24.02 12.04 6.17 4.39
262,144
64 562.96 282.83 140.29 70.33 35.14 24.81
512 565.61 282.16 141.06 70.93 35.61 23.02
4,096 588.16 293.12 147.32 73.41 36.81 25.37
32,768 763.08 383.80 204.01 95.98 48.04 33.22
Table IX
EXECUTION TIMES OF THE HYBRID METHOD IN SECONDS FOR VARIOUS
NUMBER OF DATA ITEMS, SUBTREE SIZES, AND NUMBER OF CORES ON A
30-CORE COMPUTER PLATFORM.
VII. LITERATURE ON PIR SCHEMES AND COMPARISON
There is a relatively high academic interest in efficient PIR
schemes [1–4, 6–8, 11, 12, 18, 19, 24, 27]. One of the earliest
proposals are due to Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [19], which
uses a partially homomorphic scheme based on the difficulty
of quadratic non-residue problem. The database is arranged as
a square matrix of (√n×√n), D, where n is the number of
data items. The user sends a homomorphically encrypted bit
for each column of the matrix D, where all bits are 0 except for
the bit corresponding to the column that contains the requested
data item, which is 1. The database server, then, performs
homomorphic computations for each row of D, and sends the
resulting ciphertexts back to the user. The user decrypts the
ciphertext corresponding to the row that contains the requested
data. Overall, the user sends β · √n bits to the server that
sends back β · √n bits for each bit of the requested data item
as a response, where β is the size of the ciphertext used in
homomorphic encryption scheme.
Another scheme by Boneh et al. [4] uses additive homomor-
phic computation of two-disjunctive normal form (2-DNF) of
polynomials. Disjunctive normal form is also known as sum of
products expressions of logical functions in Boolean algebra,
which basically means applying logical-OR operation on the
product terms obtained by logical AND operation on Boolean
variables. In 2-DNF in [4], each product term is logical
AND of two Boolean variables. The scheme can use additive
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homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Paillier [25]. In
the scheme, the users sends O(n1/3) ciphertexts as the query
and receives O(n1/3) ciphertexts as the response. Therefore,
the bandwidth complexity is reduced to O(n1/3) from O(n1/2)
of Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky in [19].
The scheme in [11] uses a somewhat fully homomorphic
encryption scheme (SWFHE), a topic of high interest in the
cryptographic community in recent years [5, 13, 14, 21]. Once
a fully homomorphic computation is possible (and practical),
the selection of the requested data item is reduced to homo-
morphic comparison of index bits used to address the data
items. As the comparison circuit is very simple, a SWFHE
based on a variant of NTRU [17] encryption scheme becomes
almost practical for PIR implementation. For the security
assumptions of the NTRU encryptions schemes, see [28]. One
nice property of the PIR scheme in [11], the index bits of
the requested data items from different queries can be packed
or bundled into a single query which is the homomorphic
encryption of these index bits. The bundled case can be
especially useful when many queries are generated (perhaps
by different users) to amortize the bandwidth overhead of the
PIR scheme. This, however, requires a trusted proxy server to
collect and bundle queries from possibly different users.
In all three schemes [4, 11, 19], query sizes are reasonably
low (see Table X). Especially, the SWFHE scheme in the bun-
dled case [11] offers extremely small-sized queries. However,
the bandwidth complexity has two components, namely query
and response sizes and all three schemes suffer from very
high response sizes per one bit of the requested data item as
shown in Table X. In the proposed scheme, the response is
several orders of magnitude smaller in size than in any other
scheme in Table X. As can be observed from the table, for even
small-sized data items (see the columns 6-9 of Table X), the
response sizes dominate the bandwidth complexity and query
sizes become negligible in comparison.
Since the schemes in [4, 19] are not well known for their
computational and bandwidth efficiencies we provide a more
detailed comparison of the proposed schemes against two more
recent schemes in the literature [1, 2, 11], both of which utilize
lattice-based cryptography. The former lattice-based scheme
introduced in [1, 2], claims computational efficiency while the
latter [11], which utilizes SWFHE, claims superior bandwidth
performance over the former while accepting that the former is
computationally much more efficient. We demonstrate that our
proposed scheme is always superior so far as the bandwidth
efficiency is concerned while the computational efficiency of
our scheme is comparable to or better than that in [11], but
worse than that in [1, 2]. However, we also show that the
scheme in [1, 2] can have such a poor bandwidth performance
that it is sometimes better to download the entire database in
many circumstances.
The CPIR schemes that rely on decisional trees use the
Damga˚rd-Jurik cryptosystem that is based on the decisional
composite residuosity assumption [25], which is a relatively
well studied classical problem in comparison with those secu-
rity arguments used in lattice-based solutions, especially the
one in [1, 2].
We compare the bandwidth requirements of the proposed
method with octal tree and the two other techniques in
Figures 4, 5, 6. In Figure 4, assuming that each data item
in our data base is 1,024-bit in size we change the number
of data items from 512 to 65,536 and illustrate the ratio of
exchanged bits (i.e., query + response sizes) to the size of
the entire data base. As observed from the graphs given in
logarithmic scale in Figure 4, the proposed scheme always
offers the best bandwidth performance.
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Figure 4. Bandwidth comparison of three schemes when the data item size is
1,024-bit; Melchor’s scheme in [1, 2], SWFHE and SWFHE - bundled in [11]
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Figure 5. Bandwidth comparison of three schemes with variable data item
size and n = 1, 024; Melchor’s scheme in [1, 2], SWFHE and SWFHE -
bundled in [11]
Figure 5 illustrates the bandwidth performances of the three
schemes, when the number of data items is fixed to n = 1, 024
and the data item sizes are changed from 1,024-bit to 1 million
bit. Figure 6 is similar except that we now use a database with
higher number of items, namely n = 65, 536. As pointed out
earlier in our discussions regarding the bandwidth performance
values in Table X, the response size dominates when the size of
each data item increases. This is apparent in Figures 5 and 6 as
the bandwidth performance of the bundled case of the SWFHE
scheme is almost the same as the regular SWFHE scheme.
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Scheme Query Size Resp. Size per bit Resp. Size per KB Resp. Size per 64 KB
216 (KB) 232 (MB) 216 (B) 232 (B) 216 (KB) 232 (MB) 216 (KB) 232 (MB)
KO [19] 32 8 215 223 218 216 224 222
BGN [4] 20 0.8 645 13004 5161 102 330, 280 6502
SWFHE [11] 4,000 32 250 784 2,000 6.125 128,128 392
SWFHE - Bundled [11] 6.35 0.0313 250 784 2,000 6.125 128,128 392
Proposed 42.5 32 0.625 0.875 5 ≈ 0.068 320 0.4375
Table X
COMPARISON OF BANDWIDTH REQUIREMENTS IN TERMS OF QUERY AND RESPONSE SIZES; FOR THE PROPOSED SCHEME l = 29 AND l = 215 ARE
CHOSEN FOR DATABASES WITH 216 AND 232 ITEMS, RESPECTIVELY.
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Figure 6. Bandwidth comparison of three schemes with variable data item
size and n = 216; Melchor’s scheme in [1, 2], SWFHE and SWFHE - bundled
in [11]
In Figures 4, 5, 6, the lattice-based scheme in [1, 2]
demonstrates a poor bandwidth performance. To give a better
insight we tabulate the ratios of exchanged information to the
database size in each scheme in Table XI when n = 512 and
|N | = 1, 024 bit. As can be observed in the table, the proposed
method always results in superior bandwidth performance. The
lattice-based scheme in [1, 2] requires the transmission of
fewer number of bits than the database size only after the
size of the database reaches 128 Mbit. The scheme based on
the SWFHE never offers better performance than transmitting
the entire database in this setting. The SWFHE-based scheme
bandwidth requirements will be acceptable only for databases
with many data items. For instance, for a database with 216
items where each data item is 1,024-bit, the ratio of exchanged
data to database size in the SWFHE-based PIR scheme is
0.0384, while it is only 0.0053 in the proposed scheme for
the same setting.
For server-side computations, the lattice based scheme [1,
2] is reported to offer 230 Mbit/s for a database with only
12 data items, each of which is 3 MB. The proposed method
offers about 1.23 Mbit/s for a database with 512 data items
when the parallel implementation of octal tree is used. When
more cores are used it is possible to increase the throughput of
the server-side computations. For instance, we observed that
our implementations on the 30-core computing platform can
achieve as high as about 10 Mbit/s throughput for database of
Data item size
(# of bits)
database size (#
of bits)
[1, 2] [11] Proposed
method
1 K 512 K 224 4.91 0.131
16 K 8 M 14.01 4.07 0.016
128 K 64 M 1.76 3.93 0.009
256 K 128 M 0.88 3.92 0.008
2 M 1 G 0.12 3.91 0.008
Table XI
RATIO OF EXCHANGED INFORMATION TO DATABASE IN DIFFERENT PIR
SCHEMES n = 512 AND |N | = 1, 024
32,768 items with subtree size of 64.
The SWFHE-based PIR scheme [11] reports two time
performance metrics: i) throughput when multiple requests
are bundled into a single query, hence the bundled case, and
ii) latency when a request is sent alone (single case). In the
bundled case for data items of 1,024-bit long each, the time
spent for processing a data item is given as 0.89 ms while it
is 0.79 ms for 512 item database in our scheme. On the other
hand, for the latency metric indicating the waiting time for
a user, the time spent for processing a data item of 1024-bit
is estimated to be around 16.93 ms [11]. For instance, for a
database of 512 items each of which is 1,024-bit long, a user
has to wait for a query response for about 8.7 s in the SWFHE-
based PIR scheme while in our scheme he has to wait for only
about 0.4 s.
Furthermore, if we use the scalable CPIR with eight threads
on the six-core architecture and tolerate a slight increase in
bandwidth requirements, we can achieve a better performance.
For instance, we can achieve a throughput of 1.40 Mbit/s for
a database of 4,096 items when octal subtrees with l = 3
are used. This will decrease the time spent for processing
a data item to about 0.7 ms, whereby the proposed scheme
outperforms the SWFHE-based PIR scheme [11] in terms of
throughput as well. In a case in our implementation on the
30-core computer with 262,144 items and subtree size of 64,
the time spent for processing a data item can be reduced to as
low as 0.095 ms.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We improved the CPIR protocol introduced by Lipmaa in
several ways. First, we proposed to use octal trees, instead of
binary trees in the original scheme, which results in an order
of magnitude faster implementation than the original scheme
for a database of 512 data items. We showed that the speedup
is likely to increase for higher number of data items. We then
introduced a highly-optimized parallel algorithm for shared-
memory multi-processor computing platforms. The speedup
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achieved via the proposed parallel algorithm is shown to be
proportional to the number of cores. We also proposed a hybrid
method to accelerate the CPIR protocol at the expense of a
relatively small increase in the bandwidth. Our implementa-
tions on 16-core and 30-core computing platforms for large
databases show that the execution time of the new scheme is
more than two orders of magnitude faster than the original
scheme with a straightforward serial implementation.
We compared the proposed scheme with the schemes in
the literature in terms of bandwidth requirement, measured in
terms of the total number of bits exchanged between the client
and the server. Due to log-squared communication complexity
of the original scheme, the bandwidth efficiencies of the
proposed schemes are better than those of the other schemes
by one to three orders of magnitude. Also, the adopted security
assumption in our scheme is well studied in comparison with
the alternative schemes; another reason for further interest in
the proposed schemes.
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